The second quarter of this year saw the pace of law firm mergers rise sharply in the U.S., according to a new report from legal consultancy Altman Weil Inc.

There were 26 new law firm mergers and acquisitions reported in April, May and June, compared to 18 during the first quarter of the year, according to Newtown Square, Pa.-based Altman Weil.

The largest of the latest law firm combinations was between K&L Gates, a 1,500-attorney firm, and Kennedy Convington Lobdell & Hickman, a 175-lawyer firm.

In Memphis there were no significant mergers reported for the quarter. However, in the previous quarter St. Louis-based Husch & Eppenberger LLC and Kansas City, Mo.,-based Blackwell Sanders LLP finalized their merger, which was first announced last September. Of the two, only Husch & Eppenberger had an office in Memphis.

In July 2007, Memphis-based Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz PC merged Atlanta-based Gambrell & Stolz LLP into the firm, adding 36 attorneys.

"Even in a deteriorating economy, law firms continue to pursue a growth strategy via merger and acquisition," said Altman Weil principal Tom Clay in a statement. "And based on our conversations with law firm leaders, we think the pace is unlikely to slow."

New York’s highest court has set the bar prohibitively high for proving certain civil cases against predatory clergy by ruling that a woman cannot sue a rabbi who had an affair with her because she was not “uniquely vulnerable and incapable of self-protection."

Some state and federal courts have upheld breach of fiduciary duty claims arising from sexual misconduct by clergy with adult parishioners whom they are counseling. A fiduciary duty exists, those courts said, if the clergy member “held himself out as possessing the education and experience” of a professional counselor.

Only last month, an intermediate New York appeals court recognized a fiduciary duty claim for the first time in the case of a woman who sued a Catholic priest for damages arising out of her adulterous relationship with him. Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese.

But the New York Court of Appeals pretty much slammed the door on such cases in finding last week that Adina Marmelstein had “insufficiently demonstrate[d] that she developed a fiduciary relationship” with Rabbi Mordecai Tendler.

“Allegations that give rise to only a general clergy-congregant relationship that includes aspects of counseling do not generally impose a fiduciary obligation upon a cleric,” the opinion said.

“To establish that a course of formal counseling resulted in a cleric assuming 'de facto control and dominance' over the congregant,” it continued, “a congregant must set forth facts and circumstances in the complaint demonstrating that the congregant became uniquely vulnerable and incapable of self-protection regarding the matter at issue.”

Tendler, who officiated at an Orthodox Jewish synagogue in New Hempstead, N.Y., counseled Marmelstein for emotional problems. They allegedly began their affair after he told her that “a course of sexual therapy” would make her more attractive to men and help her find a husband.

Marmelstein's allegations were insufficient, Judge Victoria A. Graffeo wrote for the appeals court, because she “has shown only that she was deceived by Tendler, not that she was so vulnerable as to surrender her will and capacity to determine her own best interests.”

In a footnote, Graffeo said she was not suggesting that “a cleric who is also a licensed professional, such as a psychiatrist, psychologist or attorney, could not assume fiduciary obligations under existing laws and the secular standards that govern the practice of those professions.”

But her decision means clerics who are not licensed professionals cannot be sued for sexual misconduct unless the plaintiff somehow meets a “vulnerability” standard which completely disregards the inherent “control and dominance” that clergy assume over congregants.

As a more enlightened New York appellate judge put it, “The hallmark of fiduciary duty -- an imbalance of power between the parties -- is especially manifest in the relationship between a priest and parishioner.” Langford v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 271 A.D.2d 494 (2000).

The family of a Texas man who allegedly died of a disease contracted from a sick cockatiel has sued PetSmart for wrongful death, but the fate of similar cases around the country suggests their products liability theory will not fly.

The cockatiel that Amanda de la Garza bought from the Corpus Christi PetSmart store on Sept. 30, 2006 was allegedly suffering from a bacterial infection that crossed over to her father and caused him to be infected with the disease psittacosis, also known as “parrot fever.” Joe de la Garza, 63, died of psittacosis two weeks later.

At least five states have rejected products liability claims against pet stores for selling a defective animal, with courts in Missouri and Ohio taking that position in cases involving parrots. “We ... conclude that a parrot is not a product for purposes of products liability,” the Ohio Court of Appeals said in Malicki v. Koci, 700 N.E.2d 913 (1997).

But in a petition filed earlier this month, the de la Garza family allege that at the time “the bird left the hands of PetSmart, Inc,, the bird was diseased, defective, and unreasonably dangerous” and its defective condition was “a producing cause” of the death of Joe de la Garza.

“As a result, PetSmart, Inc. is strictly liable to the Plaintiffs herein,” the suit says.

A PetSmart representative told KIII-TV in Corpus Christi that the company is not aware of any confirmed cases of humans contracting psittacosis from humans. The de la Garzas insist that “The diseases of birds can cross over to the human population and can cause disease in the people who buy the birds.”

Amanda de la Garza also fell ill and was hospitalized “as a result of psittacosis,” the suit alleges. But whatever the scientific facts may be, PetSmart could argue that it cannot be sued for products liability as a matter of law.

In the seminal case of Whitmer v. Schneble, 331 N.E.2d 115 (1975), the Illinois Appellate Court ruled that an animal could not be a product since its "nature" is not "fixed" when it leaves the hands of a seller.

The Missouri Court of Appeals agreed with that view in rejecting a products claim filed by a parrot buyer who allegedly contracted psittacosis from the bird. “It seems unreasonable for us to hold a seller liable for changes potentially wrought upon a 'product' by the purchaser, while the item was completely outside the seller's control,” it said in Latham v. Wal-Mart Stores, 818 S.W.2d 673 (1991).

New York, Connecticut and Oregon have ruled otherwise. As a New York trial judge said in Beyer v. Aquarium Supply Co., 404 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1997),

[T]here is no reason why a breeder, distributor or vendor who places a diseased animal in the stream of commerce should be less accountable for his actions than one who markets a defectively manufactured product. The risk presented to human well-being is as great and probably greater than that created by a defectively manufactured product.
But in the most recent case on point -- Blaha vs. Stuard, 640 N.W.2d 85 (2002) --- the South Dakota Supreme Court found a dog was not a product. And you can expect the generally conservative, pro-business Texas courts to follow the Whitmer line of cases.

The de la Garzas also allege that PetSmart and Rainbow Exotics, a Waco bird supplier, are liable for negligent inspection and handling of the cockatiel and failing to warn Amanda de la Garza that “bird disease could affect humans.”

Amanda, the suit says, noticed the bird “was subdued and had separated itself from the other birds offered for sale,” but “was told that the bird was having a 'bad day.'”

Plaintiffs have recently sued PetSmart in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, alleging family members died as a result of receiving organs from donors which had been infected with a virus contracted from pet hamsters. Those cases, however, do not allege products liability.